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NOTE
FEDERAL TAXATION OF DIVORCE PROPERTY
SETTLEMENTS AND THE AMIABLE FICTIONS OF STATE

LAW
A property settlement' pursuant to a divorce or dissolution
of marriage may have substantial federal income tax consequences2 for husbands in common law property jurisdictions.3
Since United States v. Davis4 the transfer of appreciated property
from a husband to his wife at the end of their marriage has constituted a taxable event for the husband. Although the Davis decision has been criticized,' it is still the law of the land.7 A recent
It is immaterial whether the "settlement" is the product of an agreement between
the spouses or an apportionment of property made solely by the court. The federal income
tax consequences in either case would be identical. Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d
97 (10th Cir. 1964).
2 In two such recent cases the total amount of taxes in controversy exceeded $200,000.
Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 257 (10th Cir. 1974); Imel v. United States, 375 F.
Supp. 1102, 1103 (D. Colo. 1974).
1 See Hjorth, Community Property Marital Settlements: The Problem and a
Proposal, 50 WASH. L. REV. 231 (1975), for a recent discussion of the tax consequences of
divorce property settlements in community property jurisdictions. A discussion of the
income tax consequences of divorce in general is beyond the scope of this note. See Graves,
Federal Taxation in Separationand Divorce, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1972); Gunn, The
Federal Income Tax Effects of the Missouri Version of the Uniform Divorce Act, 1974
WASH. U.L.Q. 227.
370 U.S. 65 (1962), revg 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
' See note 12 infra.
I See Schwartz, Divorce and Taxes: New Aspects of the Davis Denouement, 15
U.C.L.A.L. REV 176 (1967); Note, Property Transfer Pursuant to Divorce-Taxable
Event? 17 STAN. L. REV. 478 (1965); Note, Capital Gains Taxation on the "Transfer" of
Appreciated Property From Husband to Wife Pursuant to a Divorce Settlement, 38 IND.
L.J. 494 (1963).
1 The Davis rule has generally been expanded by the lower courts. See, e.g., Pulliam
v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964). The most recent Revenue Ruling on the
subject is based on Davis. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 6.
The opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court is In re Questions submitted by United
States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974), hereinafter referred to as Imel. The Colorado
Supreme Court rendered that opinion in response to a question concerning Colorado law
submitted by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado which arose
out of the case it was considering, Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
The question was:
Under Colorado law, is such a transfer [by a husband pursuant to a divorce
property settlement] a recognition of a 'species of common ownership' of the
marital estate by the wife resembling a division of property between coowners [and therefore not taxable to the husband], or does the transfer
more closely resemble a conveyance by the husband for the release of an
independent obligation owed by him to the wife [and therefore taxable
under Davis]?
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Colorado case, Imel v. United States,8 and Oklahoma cases' upon
which Imel relies have attempted, through interpretations of
state law, to avoid the Davis rule and thereby benefit resident
taxpayers. This note will discuss the merits of these attempts to
sidestep Davis.
I.

DAVIS

V. UNITED STATES

In Davis a Delaware husband transferred appreciated stock
to his wife pursuant to a divorce settlement "in full settlement
and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against the husband whatsoever," 10 including her rights under Delaware law to
dower, intestate succession, and to share in a portion of her husband's property upon divorce. The husband argued that under
Delaware law his wife's above-mentioned marital rights were
such that she was, in effect, a co-owner of his property, so that
as a result of the property settlement there was a nontaxable
division of property between him and his wife as co-owners,
rather than a taxable transfer to his wife of appreciated property
owned solely by him. The government argued that a Delaware
wife's marital rights did not give her an interest in her husband's
property, but merely imposed upon him certain personal obligations.
On review the Supreme Court held that while a Delaware
wife might have some interest in the property of her husband, the
interest was an inchoate one which did not remotely reach the
dignity of co-ownership. In support of its opinion the Court cited
her inability to manage or dispose of her husband's property, the
lack of descendability of her interest, the requirement that she
survive him to share in his intestate estate, and the fact that her
share of his property upon divorce depended upon the discretion
of the court. Therefore, the Court concluded that
375 F. Supp. at 1116. The Colorado Supreme Court answered that the transfer more
resembled a division between co-owners. 517 P.2d at 1334. On that basis, the district court
held that the husband was therefore not taxable for his transfer of appreciated property
to his wife. 375 F. Supp. at 1118.
The procedure of certification to the Colorado Supreme Court, in itself, is not open
to serious dispute. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974). For a criticism of this
procedure, see Mattis, Certificationof Questions of State Law: An ImpracticalTool in the
Hands of the FederalCourts, 23 MIAMI L. REV. 717 (1969).
' The Oklahoma cases followed by the Colorado Supreme Court are discussed in text
accompanying notes 80-106 infra.
" Language from the agreement quoted in 370 U.S. at 67.
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[riegardless of the tags, Delaware seems only to place a burden on
the husband's property rather than to make the wife a part owner
thereof. .

.

. [T]he rights of succession and reasonable share [at

divorce] do not differ significantly from the husband's obligations
of support and alimony. They all partake more of a personal liability
of the husband than a property interest of the wife. The effectuation
of these marital rights may ultimately result in the ownership of
some of the husband's property. . . but certainly this happenstance
does not equate the transaction with a division of property by coowners. I

Consequently, the husband realized a taxable gain upon this disposition of appreciated property."
Davis, then, requires that state law be examined to determine the property rights of spouses' 3 within the state. The statecreated property right must then be measured against the "federal criteria"' 4-the wife's power to dispose of or manage her interest, the descendability of the interest, whether she must survive her husband to receive it, and whether the size of the interest
is within the discretion of the court-to determine if the wife's
interest reaches the dignity of co-ownership so that the transaction is a nontaxable one.
On the basis of the Davis test, property settlements in community property jurisdictions, where a wife is a co-owner are
'Id. at 70.
' The Court reasoned that by its inclusive definition of income, i.e., "all income from
whatever source derived, including . . . [glains derived from dealings in property ....
[INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 61(a)(3)], Congress intended the economic growth of the stock
transferred here to be taxed. The gain to be taxed is the "excess of the amount realized
therefrom over the adjusted basis" of the stock. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(a). The
"amount realized" is "the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b). In divorce
property settlements the "property . . . received" is the release of the wife's marital
rights. The Court ruled that the fair market value of the rights released by the wife could
be determined-in an arm's length transaction such as this, the wife's marital rights may
be presumed to be equal to the fair market value of the property given her by the husband.

370 U.S. at 72, 73, rev'g 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961) which had held, following Commis-

sioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960), that it was
impossible to presume that the wife's rights were equal in value to the property transferred
by the husband for their release.
11Nowhere in Davis is this requirement expressly stated. That state law be consulted
is implicit throughout the Court's lengthy discussion of Delaware law. Moreover, Davis
has also been construed as requiring a determination of state law with respect to the
property rights of a wife. See, e.g., Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 257 (10th Cir.
1974).

" Wallace v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 748, 760 (S.D. Iowa 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d
757 (8th Cir. 1971).
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generally nontaxable. 5 The same is apparently true in common
law property states where there is an equal division of property
which is jointly acquired, either by gift or by commingling of
earnings in the acquisition of property." However, in common law
jurisdictions a transfer by a husband to a spouse who has not
commingled her earnings 7 with his in jointly acquiring property
would normally be taxed under the Davis rationale. The exception to this rule has been created by Imel and related cases. An
understanding of the marital relation and marital property rights,
both past and present, is helpful in considering Imel.
II.

A.

THE COMMON LAW MARITAL RELATIONSHIP

Early Common Law

The concept that marriage suspended the legal existence of
a wife and merged it with that of her husband had its roots in
English common law.'8 Because of this merger, marriage had severe effects upon a wife's property rights." Her tangible personalty acquired before or during the marriage became her husband's; 2 her husband became entitled to the use, enjoyment,
rents, and profits of her realty until birth of issue; 2' after birth of
issue he acquired a life estate in her realty as tenant by the
curtesy 22 which, unlike tenancy by the marital right, survived her
15 At least when there is an equal division of community property. Frances R. Walz,
32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). Of course, the situation may be more complex, as when an unequal
division of community prGperty is made. See Hjorth, supra note 3, at 252.
" Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 29, at 6. The ruling is discussed by
Hjorth, supra note 3, at 253.
" See, e.g., Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1975) where the wife
contributed her earnings for a few of their first years of marriage, stopped working, and
then made no more contributions to acquire any of the property which was the subject of
the property settlement. That case did not consider Rev. Rul. 74-347, but it does illustrate
one of many situations in which the Ruling would fail to give favorable tax treatment to
a husband in a common law property jurisdiction.
15This was not the case in many other cultures, e.g., Egyptian and certain American
Indian societies. Crozier, Marital Support, 15 BOSTON U.L. REv. 28, 29 (1935). Nor was it
true in early Saxon, Scottish, Welsh, or Civil law. Johnston, Sex and Property: The
Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward
Equality, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1033, 1044 (1972).
"' See W. TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 124 (3d ed. R. Cooley 1921), and
Johnston, supra note 18, at 1045-46.
2* 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN §§ 206-38 (1873).
2,This tenancy "by the marital right," or jure, uxoris, attached to realty of the wife
acquired before or during the marriage. 1 AMERCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.50 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952).
" Id. at § 5.57.
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death. Moreover, the husband owned his wife's earnings,223 and
she could not contract, sue, or be sued on her own behalf.

While marriage gave a husband a substantial interest in the
property of his wife, the reverse was not true. His wife acquired
no vested interest in his property until his death, at which time
she was entitled to dower and/or 21 an intestate share of her hus2
band's personalty. 1
And for all her proprietary sacrifices, what did a wife receive
from her husband at common law? Besides dower and intestate
succession,2 a wife was entitled to be supported by her husband.
The total marital relationship-with a wife losing her property
and the right to her own labor but acquiring her husband's legal
obligation of support-has been unattractively, but perhaps accurately described some 40 years ago as follows:
Such a situation can be explained on the theory that one of the
parties has an original right to the other's labor [and property]
without having to pay for it; although in no other department of life
has anyone had such an ownership . . . since the abolition of slavery. Clearly, however, that economic relationship . . . is the eco-

nomic relationship between an owner and his property rather than
that between two free persons ....

The financial plan of marriage

law was founded upon the economic relationship of owner [the husband] and property [the wife] .28

B.

Modern MaritalRights in Colorado
In the last 100 years there has been considerable change in
the rights and status of married women in Colorado. Property of
all types acquired by a woman prior to her marriage, including
TIFFANY, supra note 19, at § 48.
J. BISHOP, supra note 20, at §§ 39, 44.
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 21, at 735. At common law, dower was a

W.
2

life estate in one-third of the lands of which a husband had been seized at any time during
coverture. This interest vested only at the death of the husband, yet was protected
throughout the marriage since a wife must have joined in any conveyance by her husband
else her dower attached to such property at her husband's death. See generally id. §§ 5.15.49.
26 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 402 (2d ed. 1923); W.
TIFFANY, supra note 19, at 144-45.
71 Dower and intestate succession were rights of the Delaware wife discussed in Davis.
The third interest of the wife, her right to a reasonable share of her husband's property
upon divorce, did not exist at common law. See note 61 infra.
2 Crozier, supra note 18, at 28. Ms. Crozier, no doubt Miss or Mrs. Crozier in 1935,
was specifically criticizing the old common law rule that a husband owned his wife's labor
and earnings, but the language also describes the entire early common law marital relation.
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the rents and profits therefrom, and any property she receives by
descent, devise, or gift now remains her separate property after
her marriage, subject only to her disposal and her debts. 29 She
may sue or be sued in her own right. 0 She is entitled to earnings
from her own business or employment, 3' and may make her own
contracts. 2 In addition, a wife in Colorado, just as in all common
law property jurisdictions, 33 still retains her right to be supported
by her husband.3 4
Lest it seem that a Colorado wife has the best of both old and
new worlds,3 namely the right to own her own property as well
as the right to demand support from her husband, consider a wife
in a community property jurisdiction.36 Spouses in community
property states are viewed as equal partners with a vested one37
half interest in all the wealth acquired by the efforts of either.
Since both spouses are deemed to contribute equally, a community property wife is a one-half owner of such property despite
the fact that she may produce less income than her husband, or
no income at all. Community property husbands are also required
to support their wives.Y In contrast, "with a possible exception
or two, ''31 a Colorado wife has no vested interest in the property
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-201 (1973).
- Id. § 14-2-202.
" Id. § 14-2-203.
3 Id. § 14-2-208.
" Phipps, Marital PropertyInterests, 27 ROCKY MTN.L. REV. 180, 184 (1955).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-101 (1973) provides that failure to support and maintain a wife, and children under 16 years of age, is a felony. This statute is viewed as
enforcing, not creating a husband's duty of support. Kilpatrick v. People, 64 Colo. 209,
170 P. 956 (1918). A wife's right to support seems to be better protected today than at
common law, which provided no direct action to enforce a husband's duty of support.
Phipps, supra note 33, at 185 n.18. Now the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5-101 to -143 (1973) provides a civil in addition
to the criminal remedy for nonsupport. See Conrad v. McClearn, 166 Colo. 568, 445 P.2d
222 (1968).
" For an excellent comparison of the status and rights of wives in the United States
and those in other countries see Glendon, MatrimonialProperty: A ComparativeStudy
of Law and Social Change, 49 TULANE L. REV. 21 (1974).
36 Very briefly, a community property jurisdiction is one in which the property "the
husband and wife have is common property, that is, it belongs to both by halves." W. DE
FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1, at 1 (2d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as DE FUNIAK].
3 Id. § 1, at 2.
m Id. § 133, at 328 & n.10.
" In re Questions Submitted By United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo.
1974) (Imel).
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of her husband. Thus, for the great number of wives who do not
have separate property of their own, or who, because they earn
less than their husbands, have less property than their husbands,
the marriage partnership is one in which they are the junior partner.
Perhaps the central feature of Colorado marital law is that a
husband has separate property, free of any interests of his wife.
Yet there are at least three4" restrictions in favor of a wife which
limit a Colorado husband's rights in his separate property. They
are his wife's rights to 1) support, 2) intestate succession, and 3)
a share of her husband's property upon divorce." As will be seen
from the following discussion, and from the opinions of the
Colorado Supreme Court,4" none of these interests make a wife in
any way a co-owner in the separate property of her husband.
1. Right of Election and Intestate Succession
In Colorado a wife has the right of intestate succession. 3
Prior to the adoption of the Colorado Probate Code" the precise
nature of a wife's right to inherit the property of her husband, and
her right to elect against his will, 5 was somewhat unclear. While
these rights give her some interest in the property of her husband,
the interest can be defeated by her husband. By conveying his
property prior to his death, he could leave her with nothing. This
is illustrated by an excerpt from Richard v. James, 6 where a
" In addition a wife also has an interest in the couple's homestead in that it may not
be conveyed solely by the husband. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35-118 (1973). Dower and
curtesy have been abolished by statute in Colorado. Id. § 15-11-113.
" Subsumed in the category of support are a wife's statutory rights to maintenance
(alimony) and child support. Id. §§ 14-10-114 to -115. Only intestate succession and the
right to a share upon divorce will be discussed here. Regarding the taxation of the husband's personal obligations of support see Graves, supra note 3.
'2 See, e.g., In re Questions Submitted By United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331,
1334, 1335 (Colo. 1974) (Imel).
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-102(1) (1973) provides that the intestate share of a
surviving husband or wife is:
(a) If there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the entire intestate estate;
(b) If there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the surviving spouse
also, the first twenty-five thousand dollars, plus one-half of the balance of
the intestate estate;
(c) If there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue of the
surviving spouse, one-half of the intestate estate.
14COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-10-101 to -17-101 (1973).
The surviving spouse's right to elect is now id. §§ 15-11-201 to -202.
46 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956)
(en banc).
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widow attempted to set aside her husband's transfer of most of
his property into a trust less than a month before his death:
There no longer remains a question of doubt of the power of a husband to convey his property during his lifetime to whomsoever he
sees fit; even though it has the effect of depriving the wife of all right
to inherit any part thereof, provided the transaction is bona fide and
not merely colorable. This is true even though the express purpose
of the conveyor is to deprive another of his right of inheritance. If
the deed is genuine it cannot be said to be invalid."
If the conveyance is fraudulent, or "colorable," 5 a Colorado

wife may have some chance of setting it aside. Yet Richard v.
James shows that the express purpose of depriving a wife of her
right of inheritance does not make a conveyance fraudulent."
Neither does the fact he may have reserved a life estate, or some
other interest or powers.50 Plainly, it is difficult to characterize a
husband's transfer as fraudulent.
The right of election given a surviving spouse under the Colorado Probate Code greatly enhances a wife's right of inheritance.
The prior statute" merely granted the right to elect, despite the
provisions of his will, to take one-half of the property owned by a
husband at his death. Under case law such as James this was an
empty right if he had made substantial inter vivos transfers, leaving little from which to take one-half.2 Under the Code, however,
a wife may elect 5 3 to take one-half of her husband's "augmented
estate." 54 This estate includes not only property held by a husband at death, but also the value of property tranferred by him
at any time during the marriage to someone other than his wife
," Id. at 184, 292 P.2d at 979. This case and this topic in general are carefully dis-

cussed in Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 506, 531
(1957) and Scott, The Revocable Trust and the Surviving Spouse's Statutory Share in
Colorado, 36 COLO. L. REV. 464, 466 & n.8 (1964).
" The Colorado cases speak of a husband "defrauding" his wife by a conveyance. But
the term "fraud" has been generally used to define only the extreme situation in which

the husband executes a deed which is in truth a sham and is not intended as a conveyance
at all, i.e., a "colorable" deed. See Rea, supra note 47, at 525, 529.
" See Scott, supra note 47, at 471.
Hageman v. First Nat'l Bank, 514 P.2d 328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973). See Scott, supra

note 47, at 469-72 for a discussion of factors courts may have considered prior to the
Colorado Probate Code.
Ch. 276, § 1, [1961] Colo. Sess. Laws 864-65.
52 See Schmidt, Family Protection Under the Uniform Probate Code, 50 DENVER L.J.
137, 145 (1973).

"

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 15-11-201 (1973).

", Id. § 15-11-202, which defines the estate.
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without full consideration and in which transfer he retained a
right of possession, enjoyment, or income from the property; a
power to revoke, consume, invade, or dispose for his own benefit;
or whereby he held with another with a right of survivorship; or
where transfer was made without any of the above but within 2
years of death to the extent that the aggregate transfers to any
one donee in either of the years exceed $3,000.11 By exercising her
right to elect one-half of the aforementioned estate a wife may
effectively set aside transfers by her husband which, prior to the
adoption of the Code, would have defeated her right to inherit his
property.
Much of the pre-Code case law is overruled. However, as to
transfers in which a husband retained no interest nor power, and
which were made more than 2 years prior to death, a wife would
have to rely on pre-Code case law to vindicate her right to inherit
such property. Those cases offer very little remedy."
A Colorado wife, then, is granted only a limited interest in
her husband's separate property by virtue of her right of intestate
succession. The most significant feature about this right is that
in Colorado, as in all common law property states, a wife must
actually survive her husband in order to become vested with her
share of his intestate estate.57 This right is a mere expectancy;
should she predecease her husband, her right of intestate succession is lost and does not pass to her heirs. On the other hand, a
cardinal principle of community property jurisdictions is that a
wife's one-half interest in the community property 8 passes to her
heirs if she predeceases her husband." Moreover, a Colorado
wife's right to elect against her husband's will is also a personal
Id.
" See Schmidt, supra note 52, at 145-46.
"7COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-102 (1973) grants an intestate share only to a
surviving spouse. Section 15-11-104 even requires that a spouse must survive the deceased
spouse by 120 hours, else he or she is deemed to have predeceased the decedent and the
decedent's property passes to other heirs.
58 A community property wife's interest is especially significant where she has made
few financial contributions. She has a vested one-half interest in what would be, in a
common law state, the separate property of her husband.
s' DE FUNIAK § 1, at 2:
The community property system is marked by two essential characteristics:
(1) the transmissibility of the wife's interests to her heirs, so that if the wife
dies first, her heirs take the share to which she would have been entitled if
she had survived; and (2) during the existence of the marital relationship the
spouses are . . . joint owners, or partners . . ..
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right which disappears if unexercised prior to her death, and does
not pass to her heirs.'"
2.

Right to Property at Dissolution

A wife's right to a share of the property of her husband upon
divorce was unknown to the common law and is of statutory
origin." In the past such Colorado statutes have consistently been
interpreted as not vesting in a wife any interest in her husband's
property until the court actually orders the division. However, it
appears that she might prevent or set aside fraudulent conveyances intended to defeat her right to a division of property analogous to her remedy with regard to inheritance. 2
It is apparent that in Colorado the absence of any significant
interest of a wife in her husband's property during their marriage
is not cured by her statutory right to a share of his property upon
divorce. Her share, besides being undetermined, may be soundly
and entirely defeated prior to the decree because it is an expectancy, not a property right. In Todd v. Todd 3 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the husband's trustee in bankruptcy could
defeat the wife's statutory right to share in the property of her
husband when the date of bankruptcy occurred after an interlocutory decree had given her possession of the property, after the
final decree of divorce, and after the hearing concerning division
of property, but before the court had made an order actually
awarding her a share of her husband's property. Obviously, her
right to a share at divorce was not such that it gave her any
protectible interest prior to the actual award of her husband's
property. Her expectancy was defeated because "[d]ivision of
" This was true of the pre-Code right as construed by the Colorado courts. See Gallup
v. Rule, 81 Colo. 335, 255 P. 463 (1927) and Deutsch v. Rohlfing, 22 Colo. App. 543, 126
P. 1123 (1912). The present Code expressly states that the election is a right which may
be exercised only during the lifetime of the surviving spouse. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1511-203 (1973). Should it not be exercised, a wife who had received nothing under the will
would leave nothing therefrom to her heirs, and they would be unable to exercise the right
for her.
11 2 J. Bisiop, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION
§§ 1117, 1139 (1891).
62 See, e.g., Zingone v. Zingone, 136 Colo. 39, 314 P.2d 304 (1957), wherein the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded a dismissal of a wife's counterclaim against
her husband's parents to recover the house he had conveyed to them. The court said the
wife was in a position similar to that of a creditor whose debtor had fraudulently conveyed
property, or a wife whose husband had conveyed property to defraud his wife of her right
to support and maintenance.
" 133 Colo. 1, 291 P.2d 386 (1956).
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property, [and] property settlements . . . are within the sound
discretion of the trial court and no rights vest until the matters
involved are determined. ""
Similarly, Du Bois v. First National Bank65 held that a wife
who has been awarded a one-third interest in certain realty of her
husband must take that interest subject to a mortgage given by
her husband after their marriage but prior to her action for divorce. Consequently, the interest awarded could be foreclosed by
the mortgagee. The court stated that the bank's knowledge of
their martial problems did not apprise it of the fact that she
would obtain a decree of divorce and an interest in her husband's
property, and that even "if the bank could foresee such an end
to their unhappiness, its lien on the property, taken in good faith,
would not be subordinate to the purchaser's title which she
subsequently secured.""6 It can be concluded that a wife's right
to a share at divorce does not give her an interest which is safe
from an encumbrance created by her husband, even one created
after their marriage.
Finally, in Dickinson v. Dickinson 7 a wife, suing to set aside
a fraudulently induced property settlement, was awarded onehalf of her husband's net worth at the time of their divorce, less
the amount already received pursuant to the agreement. Her action was not to annul the decree so that the court might make an
equitable division of property. Instead, her argument rested
solely upon the contention that she was entitled, by virtue of their
marital relationship, to one-half of the property owned by her
husband at the time of the divorce. In reversing, the court held
that her counsel's contention
that she is entitled to a share of the defendant's property, solely
because it was acquired by the defendant during the period the
marriage relation existed between them, without regard to the divorce proceedings .... is not tenable. The property acquired by the
defendant during the period he was married to plaintiff belonged to
him. Plaintiff had no such interest in this property as would invest
her with the right to maintain an action, the sole purpose of which
was to secure any part of it, either during coverture or after the
Id. at 5, 291 P.2d at 387 (emphasis added).
43 Colo. 400, 96 P. 169 (1908).

Id. at 404, 96 P. at 170. The court also found that Mrs, DuBois had failed to prove
fraud in the transaction.
"

" 50 Colo. 232, 114 P. 652 (1911).
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marriage relation had been dissolved ....
[T]he judgment ...
must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to
dismiss ....
1

All of this is not to say that a wife is not entitled to a share
of her husband's property upon divorce. That is not the question.
The issue is the nature of her right to receive such a share.
Colorado, and other common law property states, have chosen to
make that right an equitable one which does not vest in her any
interest in her husband's property. Nor, absent fraud, may she
prevent her husband from conveying or encumbering any of his
separate property. It apparently has never even been suggested
in Colorado that her right is descendible so that it would go to
her heirs should she predecease her husband. Instead of a system
of community property wherein each spouse is entitled to onehalf of the community property at the dissolution of the marriage, 9 Colorado's system allows a husband to retain his separate
property subject to an equitable share for his wife upon dissolution. In determining how much of her husband's property a wife
should receive, Colorado courts have, pursuant to the various
statutes," traditionally considered
whether the property was acquired before or after marriage, the
efforts and attitudes of the parties towards its accumulation, the
respective ages and earning abilities of the parties, the conduct of
the parties during the marriage, the duration of the marriage, their
stations in life, their health and physical condition, the necessities
of the parties, their financial condition, and all other relevant circumstances.7"

As to the efforts of a wife in the accumulation of property by
her husband,72 courts have often considered her contribution as a
housewife in making an equitable division.7 3 Naturally, where a
wife has participated in the operation of a joint business with her
" Id. at 235, 114 P. at 653.
" Again, a community property wife's right to one-half of the community property is
most significant, in comparison to that of her common law counterpart, when the wife
makes only small financial contributions to the community property. In that situation,
she would have a vested one-half interest in property which in a common law state, would
be the separate property of her husband.
70 Colorado's old statute provided that property be divided "in such proportions as
may be fair and equitable." Ch. 37, § 6, [1958] Colo. Sess. Laws 223.
Carlson v. Carlson, 497 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Colo. 1972) (citations omitted).
7 Of course, property acquired by a wife with her own funds is her own separate
property.
" See, e.g., Schrader v. Schrader, 156 Colo. 521, 400 P.2d 675 (1965).
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husband or contributed similar nondomestic efforts, that too will
the division is within the
be considered by the court.7" In all cases
75
sound discretion of the trial court.

The Tenth Circuit considered the nature of a wife's property
rights in Colorado, and whether a husband should be taxed on his
transfer of appreciated property to her upon divorce, in Pulliam
v. Commissioner.71 It noted that "[u]nder Colorado law the

wife's rights during marriage do not vest in her an ownership of
any part of the husband's property.

' 77

And because "the wife's

interests are very similar to those in Delaware considered in
United States v. Davis, ''7 it held that the transfer pursuant to the
divorce decree was a taxable event for the husband.
Now, some 12 years later, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held in Imel that there is an exception to the rule stated in
Pulliam that a Colorado wife has no vested interest in the property of her husband during the marriage. The exception is that
"vesting takes place at the time of the filing of the divorce action."7 In creating that exception, the court followed the philoso-

phy of the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressed in Collins v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission0 and modified in Sanditen v.
Sanditen.81
In Collins v. Commissioner," called Collins I, the Tenth Circuit, relying on its decision in Pulliam, held that an Oklahoma
husband was taxable in a divorce property settlement. The husband had argued that the Oklahoma property division statute, by
commanding a court to make a division of jointly acquired property,3 thereby vested an interest in each spouse in such property.
7, See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 156 Colo. 513, 400 P.2d 440 (1965). Also, where a wife is jointly
operating a business with her husband and is contributing her own funds, she is a joint
tenant although title is in her husband's name. Therefore, at divorce she is entitled to her
share as a joint tenant and "not claiming in the capacity of [a] wife." Wigton v. Wigton,
73 Colo. 337, 341, 216 P. 1055, 1057 (1923). This is distinguishable from the facts in Imel,
where Mrs. Imel contributed her efforts to her husband's business, but not her own funds.
For that reason Imel more closely resembles Bell.
11See, e.g., Nunemacher v. Nunemacher, 132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 662 (1955).
,9 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964).
77 Id.
71 Id. at 99.
7' 517 P.2d at 1333.
446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
" 496 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1972).
" 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968).
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961) provides that as to property
13 The statute, OKxI.
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Acknowledging that Davis required an examination of state law,
the Tenth Circuit could find no difference between Oklahoma
and Colorado law sufficient to compel a result opposite that
reached in Pulliam. The wife's right to a share of her husband's
property, where such was jointly acquired, vested no interest in
her during the marriage, notwithstanding the language of some
early Oklahoma cases.84 This right was not descendible," its
quantum was within the discretion of the court, and it gave her
no right to manage or dispose of the property in question.86 As in
Colorado, a wife's right to a share in Oklahoma failed the Davis
tests.
Neither did the Tenth Circuit find that the other right of an
Oklahoma wife, that of intestate succession, made her a coowner. As in Colorado, an Oklahoma wife must survive her husband to receive her intestate share, and should she predecease
him, her right of intestate succession would not pass to her heirs.87
"acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in
either or both of said parties, the court shall make such division between the parties
respectively as may appear just and reasonable.
... Jointly acquired property is not
defined in the statute, but from the cases it is clear that where a wife performs only
domestic duties she is contributing to the acquisition of property, so that most property
acquired during the marriage would be jointly acquired. See Note, Domestic Relations:
Relevant Factors in the Division of Jointly Acquired Property, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 288, 289
(1970).
" The Tenth Circuit had some difficulty with Davis v. Davis, 61 Okla. 275, 161 P.
190 (1916) which stated that a wife did have a vested interest in her husband's property.
A careful reading of that case shows that the court meant that a wife's statutory right to
have a division of property, wherein she might get some interest, was a vested right which
could not be defeated by her misconduct. This is a much flimsier right than a vested
interest in property and could be called a vested right in an expectancy.
11 Citing Jones v. Farris, 180 Okla. 341, 69 P.2d 344 (1937) wherein the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the mandatory division of property section of the divorce statute
did not vest in a wife a right in jointly acquired property which would pass to her heirs
upon her death.
11Consequently, the language of Thompson v. Thompson, 70 Okla. 207, 173 P. 1037
(1918) labeling jointly acquired property as being similar to community property fails to
make a wife a co-owner under the Davis tests.
87 Oklahoma has a peculiar statute which gives a wife a greater right of intestate
succession than does Colorado or other common law property states. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
84, § 213 (1970):
Second ....
Provided, that in all cases where the property is acquired by
the joint industry of husband and wife during coverture, and there is no
issue, the whole estate shall go to the survivor, at whose death, if any of the
said property remain, one-half of such property shall go to the heirs of the
husband and one-half to the heirs of the wife, according to the right of
representation. (Emphasis added).
Under this statute a wife's heirs might receive her share of jointly acquired property
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Shortly after Collins I the Oklahoma Supreme Court was
called upon to determine Mr. Collins' tax liability on the same
property settlement, this time under an Oklahoma tax statute8
very similar to section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code. Referred to as Collins II,1 the issues were identical to those considered by the Tenth Circuit in Collins I. While the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided the husband's liability only under the state
statute, it clearly rejected the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit
regarding the similar federal statute and concluded that the
Oklahoma statute providing for a mandatory division of jointly
acquired property gave a wife a vested property interest therein."
The court relied upon Davis v. Davis9 for the proposition
that a wife has a vested interest in jointly acquired property. Yet
that case held only that the wife's statutory right to a share upon
divorce is not forfeited because she was at fault in the divorce
action. 2 Citing Williams v. Williams,93 the Collins II court
stressed that the kind of property which may be divided at divorce, jointly acquired property, is not subject to the discretion
of the court. However, the kind of discretion which United States
v. Davis implied was inconsistent with the notion that a wife was
a co-owner was the court's discretion to make a "reasonable"
division of property. 4 Collins I based its conclusion that an Oklaeven when she predeceases her husband. This does not mean, however, that an Oklahoma
wife, just as a community property wife, has a vested interest in such property which
would always pass to her heirs even when she predeceases her husband. The surviving
husband's dissipation of the jointly acquired property, or his remarriage, could leave her
heirs with nothing. Consequently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has said this statutory
rule is not a rule of property but a rule of descent and distribution. Essex v. Washington,
198 Okla. 145, 176 P.2d 476 (1946).
The Oklahoma statute is now OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2310 (1966).
,' Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (1968).
"
Collins II contains little discussion of intestate succession. The court acknowledged
that the statute governing intestate succession was a rule of descent and distribution, not
of property. Id. at 296. See note 87 supra.
11 61 Okla. 275, 278, 161 P. 190, 193 (1916).
2 See note 84 supra.
'3 428 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1967).
11 370 U.S. at 70. The Oklahoma divorce statute, like Delaware's, empowers the court
to "make such division between the parties respectively as may appear just and reasonable
....
" OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961). Also to distinguish the facts in Davis, the
Collins H court stated, in dictum, that factors traditionally considered by divorce courts,
such as the financial needs of the spouses, were not to be considered in Oklahoma. Only
the actual efforts and money contributed by the parties should be considered. Presumably, it might then be said that the court was not actually exercising any discretion at all
in dividing property. 446 P.2d at 296-97. Ignoring financial need has been criticized as
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homa wife's interest was similar to that of a wife in a community
property state upon Thompson v. Thompson. 5 While that case
contained some very broad language, it merely held that a husband could be awarded jointly acquired property which was held
in the name of his wife. The case did not hold that spouses in
Oklahoma have the same rights as those in community property
states. Finally, the court concluded that Colorado law was so
different from Oklahoma's" that Pulliam was not controlling.
Nor was it bound by the Tenth Circuit's holding in Collins I that
an Oklahoma wife's right to a statutory share upon divorce did
not make her a co-owner under the Davis tests, because the
operation of the Oklahoma divorce statute is not affected by the
absence of "a right to make present disposition of property, nor
absence of a descendable interest. A wife has a vested interest in
jointly acquired property of the marital community [by virtue of
'' 7
that statute]. 9
It is certainly true that the Davis criteria of descendibility,
management, and the right of disposition do not control the operation of the Oklahoma divorce statute. A wife in that state may
claim her share under that statute regardless of Davis. The issue,
however, is whether the interest given an Oklahoma wife by that
statute is such that, using the Davis criteria, she is a co-owner
claiming her one-half of the marital property, or whether, as in
harsh and has not been consistently followed by the court since Collins I. Note, supra
note 83, at 291.
Moreover, the fact the division is solely on the basis of the parties' contributions is
not sufficient to avoid Davis. There the Supreme Court did imply that a discretionary
division was inconsistent with the concept of a vested interest in the wife. But the Court
also required more-that the wife's alleged property interest be descendible, and that she
be able to manage or dispose of it-else she was not a true co-owner.
'5 70 Okla. 207, 173 P. 1037 (1918).
IS The few differences are: 1) Only contribution is to be considered in Oklahoma,
although domestic contributions are sufficient; 2) A property division is mandatory in
Oklahoma; and 3) There is some difference in the rights of an Oklahoma wife's heirs to
receive property of a surviving husband, although the Oklahoma Supreme Court ignored
this in Collins I.
17446 P.2d at 297. By this the court obviously meant to deny the applicability of the
Davis tests. Yet it attempted to bolster the wife's interest by saying it was exercisable "at
any time during marriage, even though she is not entitled to divorce." Id. Apparently the
court was referring to a wife's right to a division of property in a separate maintenance
proceeding. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1275 (1961). However, that she is entitled to a
division absent a divorce does not greatly enhance her interest in her husband's property.
She is still unable to control it, or to make a present or testamentary disposition. Under
Davis, she is still not a co-owner, and this division ought to be as taxable as one pursuant
to a divorce.
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Davis, her interest does not reach the dignity of co-ownership.
From that perspective, it is inconsequential that the Oklahoma
court labels the interest that she has under the statute as
"vested." Whether vested or not, does it meet the Davis criteria?
The Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to answer that question
in Collins IV' when its Collins I decision was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, called Collins III,"9 for further
consideration in light of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's opinion
in Collins II. The opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court was one
paragraph in length and did not purport to limit its earlier Davis
decision. Nor did it discuss the merits of Collins II. Nevertheless,
the Tenth Circuit reversed itself and held that the factors in
Davis were not "federal criteria"'' 0 which must be met by state
law before a wife's rights could be considered those of a co-owner.
The language of Davis is to the contrary. 0' The Tenth Circuit's
opinion is supportable though, since it concluded that by Collins
II the Oklahoma Supreme Court had proclaimed wives in that
state to be co-owners of property jointly acquired during the marriage. If that is what Collins H proclaimed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has since changed its mind.
02 which was not a divorce action,
In Sanditen v. Sanditen,1
an Oklahoma wife seized upon the vested property right given her
by Collins II and on that basis attempted to recover from her
husband her portion of property jointly acquired that he had
given away gratuitously without her knowledge or consent. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Collins H had not given her
such an interest. The Sanditen court said Collins II held only that
the wife's right to property, granted by the mandatory property
division section of the divorce statute, became vested during the
412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
393 U.S. 215 (1968)(per curiam). This is the entire opinion:
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment is vacated
and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration
in light of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in [Collins II].
412 F.2d at 212.
101 370 U.S. 65, 70 (1961). By the Court's holding that state "tags" did not change
the fact that Delaware law places only a burden on her husband's property, rather than
make her "a part owner thereof," it is apparent the Court ignored state labels and looked
to the substance of state law. See text accompanying notes 125-26 infra; accord, Wallace
v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 748, 760-61 (S.D. Iowa 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.
1971).
496 P.2d 365 (Okla. -1972).
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pendency of the divorce action. 03 Further, a wife has no vested
interest in property jointly acquired, for if she had that would
make Oklahoma a community property jurisdiction, which it is
not. ' 4 Therefore, except during the pendency of a divorce action
a wife in Oklahoma is not a co-owner.1°5
A leak sprung in the dike fashioned by Sanditen. In
McDaniel v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,06 a husband transferred to his wife property held in his name but acquired by their
joint efforts during their marriage. He claimed that under Collins
II his wife already had a vested interest in the property and in
effect was a co-owner, so that the division did not constitute a gift
by him which could be taxed. After noting that it had made
several pronouncements in Collins II not necessary to support the
result reached,0 7 the court reiterated its holding in Sanditen that
an Oklahoma wife is vested with an interest in jointly acquired
property only during the pendency of a divorce. Interestingly, the
court stated that where there was no divorce action the jointly
acquired property is owned by the husband. 18 He has the sole
power of disposition; he alone can transfer it; he is liable for the
property taxes thereon; and his wife has no descendible interest
therein. 0 9

III. Imel

AND

Davis

The Colorado Supreme Court expressly followed Collins II,
Sanditen, and McDaniel in its Imel decision. The court held that
while in general a wife had no interest in the property of her
husband,"' such an interest was vested in her upon the filing of
"03
Id.

at 367.

104Id.
101 This did not mean that Mrs. Sanditen was not entitled to relief. The court held
that although she had no vested interest until a divorce action was commenced, she could
prevent or recover conveyances made by her husband to defraud her right to a share of
property upon divorce. The same right exists in Colorado, see note 62 supra.
"
499 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1972).
07 Id. at 1393. One of which evidently was that a wife is, in general, a co-owner or
one with a vested interest.
00 Id. at 1394.
'"Id.

517 P.2d at 1334-35. From the cases cited the court meant by this that a wife could
prohibit transfers to defraud her of her right of intestate succession. See text accompanying notes 43-56 supra. The court made no mention of those cases allowing a wife to prohibit
fraudulent transfers prior to a divorce.
11
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a divorce action."' The court found no significant difference between the Oklahoma and Colorado divorce statutes pertaining to
the mandatory division of property."' It went a step beyond either
Sanditen or McDaniel when it declared that it was not "concerned" with the situation in which "one of the parties dies or the
action is dismissed prior to a decree of divorce or prior to a division of property." ' 13 The wife's right was inchoate only in that
prior to the division the particular property to be transferred had
not been determined." 4 After the filing her rights are analogous
to those of a wife who has a resulting trust in the property of her
husband, so that it is not necessary, after the filing, for both
spouses to join in the conveyance of property held in the name of
only one of them." 5 It is submitted that the interest described by
the court in Imel is not, applying the Davis tests, sufficient to
make her a co-owner. But then assuming, arguendo, that she does
become a co-owner upon the filing of a divorce action, the fallacy
of holding that there is no taxable transfer in such a situation is
easily illustrated.
It is admitted by both the Oklahoma and Colorado Supreme
Courts that prior to the filing of a divorce action, a wife has no
interest in the property of her husband. Her interest, unlike that
of wives in community property states, arises from the transfer
mandated by the property division portions of the divorce statute."' That this interest vests upon the filing of a divorce action,
if true, should be a taxable event in itself. Presumably the wife
suddenly has become a co-owner. By filing her action she has
what is in effect a vested undivided interest as a joint tenant. The
fact that it is undivided should not make a difference for tax
purposes." 7 It is not uncommon for a divorce court to fashion a
property settlement in which there is not a partitioning of the
property, but rather where the former spouses are made joint
.. Id. at 1332, 1334, 1335.
"I Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1335. By this the court implied that the wife's interest "vested" upon filing
...
the divorce action, but should the action be dismissed, or one of the spouses die, she would
lose her interest. The district court described her interest as a vested one subject to
divestment. 375 F. Supp. at 1118.
"1 517 P.2d at 1335.
115

Id.

Collins I, 446 P.2d at 296-97. Imel relies upon Collins II in general and seems to
have reached the same conclusion. 517 P.2d at 1334-35.
"' There are apparently no reported cases directly on point.
"'
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tenants in the property acquired by the husband."' Since she was
not a co-owner prior to the transfer, why should that transfer not
be taxable as the one in Davis? In Davis the wife actually received
her husband's property prior to the divorce, yet that was a taxable disposition because prior to that time she was not a co-owner.
The same reasoning applied to Imel and Collins H. Prior to the
time of the alleged vesting the wife was not a co-owner. Consequently that vesting, like the transfer in Davis, could be viewed
as a taxable event.
A better interpretation of Imel and Collins II is that, instead
of receiving a vested interest which makes her a co-owner, a wife's
marital rights, after the filing of a divorce action, become protectible by the court. Imel was not "concerned""' with situations in
which the wife died after filing her action. And since the court did
not reverse its earlier holdings,'1 it can be inferred that should a
wife die, her interest would not be descendible. Presumably neither could she dispose of her share, nor begin to manage or control
it. In addition her husband may convey property without joining
her. Given the limited nature of the wife's rights, even after vesting, it is clear that whatever right she has is not the same right
as that of a co-owner. All that is accomplished by the vesting is
that the wife's interest thereafter may be protected by the court
even though its quantum is as yet undetermined.1" ' That, however, adds nothing to the rights a wife had before these cases. In
Colorado a wife has been able for some time to prevent transfers
22
to defraud her.'
While neither Imel nor Collins II expressly purports to govern
the federal taxation of property settlements,'" both courts reIRS In McDonald v. McDonald, 150 Colo. 492, 374 P.2d 690 (1962) the court decreed
that property owned by the spouses in joint tenancy should remain in joint tenancy after
their divorce. Oklahoma favors a partitioning, but has upheld a decree making a division
of property by designating the spouses as tenants in common. Smith v. Smith, 206 Okla.
206, 242 P.2d 436 (1952).
"' 517 P.2d at 1335.
See text accompanying notes 43-56 and 60 supra.
...517 P.2d at 1335.
'2 See note 62 supra. The current Colorado statute enables the court to issue a
temporary injunction restraining either spouse from transferring or encumbering any
property after the commencement of proceedings for the dissolution of marriage. CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-108(2)(a) (1973). The prior statute allowed a similar order. Ch.
37, § 6, [19581 Colo. Sess. Laws 223.
" Nevertheless, the court in Imel stated that
[in Colorado a wife may have a certain species of common ownership in
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jected the rule in Davis that co-ownership was to be determined
with reference to federal criteria.' It is submitted that when
state and federal decisions are in conflict, the findings of federal
courts regarding the federal taxation of state-created property
rights should prevail regardless of the label given these rights by
the state courts.
IV.

STATE AND FEDERAL CONFLICTS

Davis itself did not elucidate carefully the role played by
state laws and state court decisions in federal income taxation.
It did make clear that whether a wife was a co-owner so that there
was no taxable disposition of property by her husband was a
question of federal and not state law.' By that holding the Supreme Court did not presume to control the rights of the parties
under state law. That the Court did attempt to do so is the straw
man created by state decisions. 128 Instead, the Court meant that
the operation of the federal taxing statutes upon state-created
rights cannot be determined by state law, but must be determined by referring to the objects intended to be taxed by the
federal statute. There is much support for this conclusion.
The oft cited'2 case of Burnet v. Harmel'2 held that Texas'
characterization of an oil and gas lease as a sale rather than a
lease did not prevent the federal income tax statute from taxing
the "sale" as if it were a lease. The taxpayer argued that if Texas
law classified the transaction as a sale, it must be taxed as a sale
and not as a lease. The federal act taxing sales of this kind of
asset' 2 imposed a lower tax than the section which taxed leases
of the same property. The Court flatly rejected the taxpayer's
the husband's property which will not prevent a taxable transfer from occurring when he makes a transfer to her. If so, that is distinguishable from the
species of common ownership which vests upon the filing of the divorce
action.
517 P.2d at 1335.
"I Collins II said that the right to make a disposition of her interest and the lack of
its descendibility were not controlling. 446 P.2d at 297. Imel, besides its general adoption
of Collins II, simply ignored the criteria, stating it was not "concerned" with the situation
in which a spouse died, and declared that a transfer of property pursuant to a settlement
resembled a division of property between two co-owners. 517 P.2d at 1334-35.
12 370 U.S. at 70.
"z As where the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Collins II held that the Davis factors
did not control the operation of Oklahoma's divorce statute. 446 P.2d at 297.
"' See, e.g., 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 61.02, at 2 (1970).
'n 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
"' Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 208(a), 43 Stat. 262.
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argument that whether a sale had occurred depended upon the
law of the State of Texas. The federal statute
neither says nor implies that the determination of ...
[whether
there was a sale] . . . is to be controlled by state law. For the
purpose of applying this section to the particular payments now
under consideration, the Act of Congress has its own criteria, irrespective of any particular characterization of the payments in the
local law. The state law creates legal interests but the federal statute
determines when and how they shall be taxed. We examine the
Texas law only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the leases
conform to the standard which the taxing statute prescribed ....
"I

The Davis Court, using a similar rationale, concluded that
Congress, by its broad definition of income, intended that the
131
appreciation of the stock transferred by the husband be taxed,
and that the controlling federal statutory language "sale or other
disposition" of property included his transfer to his wife.' 31 In
other words, whether there is a taxable transfer from husband to
wife or a nontaxable division between them is dependent upon
the Court's interpretation of congressional intent regarding the
taxation of interests or property created by the state. It does not
depend, as Imel and Collins urge, upon the label or tag the state
chose to give the wife's interest. The nature of the right created
is to be determined by the federal court, which then determines
whether that right is an object intended to be taxed by the federal
3
statute. 11
That a federal court may make an independent appraisal of
state-created property rights, and then determine the effect of the
federal tax statute upon a transaction involving those rights, is
supported by the early case of United States v. Robbins.'34 A
husband and wife domiciled in the community property state of
287 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).

370 U.S. at 68.
132
3

Id. at 71.

Accord, Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940), where the Court

determined that what Wisconsin called a special power of appointment was actually the
same interest meant to be taxed under a statute which taxed general powers of appointment. While the act did not actually define a "general power of appointment," the Morgan
Court, like the Davis Court, was able to determine Congress' intent in that regard. "If it
is found in a given case that an interest or right created by local law was the object
intended to be taxed, the federal law must prevail no matter what name is given to the
interest or right by state law," Id. at 81. This process has been called the "economic
realities" test. 10 J. MERTENS, supra note 127, at 3.
34 269 U.S. 315 (1926). See generally Swihart, Federal Taxation of New Mexico Community Property, 3 NATURAL RES. J. 104, 116-24 (1963).

1975
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California had attempted to file separate income tax returns
whereby each would report one-half of the community income,
which in their case was either earned solely by the husband or
came from his separate property. The Treasury Department at
that time did not permit the splitting of community income between spouses domiciled in California,' 5 presumably because the
interest of a California wife in the community property was insubstantial and amounted to a mere expectancy while her husband was alive.' 6 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes,
affirmed the ruling of the Treasury Department. Holmes' opinion
rested on the ground that California Supreme Court cases showed
that the wife had only an expectancy. Unlike other community
property jurisdictions, a California wife had no descendible interest in the community property. Davis' requirement that a wife
must have a descendible interest in order to be a co-owner is thus
in accord with Robbins. Collins I and Imel either ignore or deny
the requirement that a wife have a descendible interest to be a
co-owner. Neither of these decisions make the wife's interest descendible, nor does the prior case law.'37
Subsequent to Robbins, California enacted a statute making
the wife's one-half interest in the community property descendible,' 35 and subsequently the Supreme Court held that California
spouses could split their income.' 9 Justice Holmes' dicta in
Robbins-that a California husband could be taxed upon the
whole of community income because he possessed extensive control over it' 4 -was not followed in later cases. In Poe v.
Seaborn,'41 one of several test cases which argued Holmes' dicta,
the first-mentioned factor which indicated the substance of the
wife's interest in the community property was her right to make
a testamentary disposition.'4 2
"I T.D. 3138, 4 Cum. BULL. 238 (1921) allowed income splitting in all the other
community property states. Congress has, since 1948, provided for joint returns in all
states. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2, 6013. There remain, however, income tax advantages
for community property spouses who receive community income. See Swihart, supra note
134, at 126.
' ' 269 U.S. at 326.
"3 See text accompanying notes 43-56 supra.
lu Ch. 18, § 1, [1923] Cal. Sess. Laws.
"' United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931)(per curiam).
,,O269 U.S. at 327.
' 282 U.S. 101 (1930). This case was cited in Davis for the proposition that until
Congress granted relief (e.,., joint returns) common law jurisdictions have fewer tax
advantages than community property states. 370 U.S. at 71.
"1 282 U.S. at 110. See also Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118, 121 (1930); Hopkins v.
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Colorado and Oklahoma's description of a wife's interest in
the property of her husband as "vested" subsequent to the filing
of a divorce action does not change the result dictated by Davis
or Pulliam. The rule is that the nature of the state-created right
must be ascertained by a federal court which decides whether the
right created or the transaction which occurred is the object to be
taxed by the taxing statute.4 3 So the conclusory label "vested"
does not determine whether the essential federal criteria for coownership have been met. As has been seen, the wife's vested
right is not descendible, it gives her no rights of management or
disposition, and, certainly in the Colorado case, its quantum was
subject to the discretion of the divorce court. Notwithstanding
being "vested," the wife's rights are insufficient to prevent the
operation of the federal tax upon the husband's transfer. This
would by no means be the first instance of a federal court's disregarding a vested state property right in matters of federal taxation. 44
CONCLUSION

Except for allowing a wife her separate property and earnings, little change has occurred in marital property law in comBacon, 282 U.S. 122, 126 (1930); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 131 (1930); Swihart, supra
note 134, at 119-21.
"
That principle has also been explained as follows:
State law is not used for tax purposes in the same way that it is employed by a federal court exercising jurisdiction in diversity cases under the
principle of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. Under the Erie doctrine . . . state law
furnishes the substantive rule of decision. In tax cases, on the other hand,
the substantive rule is federal, and state law merely establishes some of the
facts to which the court applies federal law in order to reach its conclusions.
Whether or not a particular fact is to be established by means of state law
is a matter of legislative intent.
Note, The Role of State Law in Tax Determinations,72 HARV. L. REv. 1350, 1351 (1959)
(footnotes omitted).
"I The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, on April 30, 1975, heard oral arguments on
the appeal of Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974). The district court
followed the opinion it received from the Colorado Supreme Court in response to the
question it certified to that court. The Tenth Circuit has not yet decided the case. Dicta
in two recent Tenth Circuit cases indicate that court favors the Davis rule. See Wiles v.
Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1974) and Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d
462, 468 (10th Cir. 1974), where, referring to a wife's vested right announced in Imel, the
court said
[sluch a characterization is not controlling for tax purposes. Rather, consideration must be given to the true nature of the transfer under Colorado law.
When so viewed, it is apparent that Colorado places a burden upon the
husband's property rather than making the wife a part owner thereof.
Id. (citation omitted).
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mon law states," 5 including Colorado and Oklahoma. A wife in
these states is not allowed a one-half interest in marital property146 which she may manage and control, or dispose of presently
or by will. Instead, she is entitled to her own property, which is
often less than that of her husband. She is also given certain
rights against the property of her husband should the marriage
be dissolved by divorce or death, but these rights do not make her
husband's property subject to her control or disposition.'47 In the
case of divorce her interest is not even a fixed share."' As Davis
Johnston, supra note 18, at 1090:
Beyond a married woman's separate property and outside earnings...
there has been no fundamental change in marital property law. Wives are
still expected to perform services in the home for their husbands without
recompense beyond the limits of the husband's duty of support.
14 Colorado's new Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act defines marital property to
be divided at dissolution as all property acquired by either spouse after the marriage
except that acquired by gift, bequest, devise, descent, and some other property. COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-113(2) (1973). Marital property closely resembles community
property. However, the statute does not make Colorado a community property state
because it does not give a wife, or either spouse, any interest in the marital property which
they did not already have in Colorado. Instead of changing Colorado into a community
property state, the statute, by its express terms, merely specifies what property may be
divided upon dissolution. Id.
"I The Colorado Supreme Court in Imel evidently felt it could skirt this deficiency
by holding that the right which vested upon filing a divorce action (which even then was
not descendible) was inchoate prior to that time (and therefore naturally beyond the wife's
control and disposition) only in the sense that the specific property to be transferred had
not yet been determined. 517 P.2d at 1335. The weakness of this argument is that a true
co-owner, such as a wife in a community property state, need not have her one-half
interest specifically determined before she may dispose of it, e.g., at death. DE FUNIAK §§
198-99.
Equally unavailing is the argument that the right to a share at divorce makes her a coowner because the statute granting it is mandatory. Besides the fact that she could get
much less than one-half and perhaps nothing, the mere fact it is mandatory that the court
give her some of her husband's property does not give her the rights of control and
disposition that Davis demands.
"' It has been argued (e.g., by Gunn, supra note 3, at 249 n.87) that because the
quantum of a wife's share upon divorce in a common law property state is subject to the
discretion of the court should not cause a different tax result than a divorce in a community property jurisdiction, since several of those states have similar provisions. See DE
FUNIAK § 227. Davis implied that the discretion granted the trial court was inconsistent
with the notion the wife was a co-owner. 370 U.S. at 70. See also note 94 supra. It is
submitted that, while a discretionary division would seem inconsistent with the concept
of co-ownership in either jurisdiction, there is nevertheless a fundamental difference between the two situations.
In common law property states the existence of a court's discretionary power to divide
the husband's property is reflective of the fact that his wife never had a vested interest
therein, and that whatever interest she will receive is dependent upon the discretion of
the court. "What [she will receive] might be ascertained independently of the extent of
"'
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held, such rights impose a burden upon the property of her husband, but hardly make her a co-owner thereof. A state's declaration, as in Imel or Collins II, that she is theoretically a co-owner
but without the rights of one is a "theoretical protestation"'4 9 that
she ought to be viewed as a co-owner for tax purposes despite the
true nature of her rights. The state's label fails to prevent the tax
imposed by Davis because it fails to make her a true co-owner.
For that reason it does not seem unfair'50 to tax the husband, who,
like Mr. Davis, has his property to himself but alleges his wife
owns it too. Why should he have it both ways?
The Davis criteria-a descendible property right not subject
to the discretion of a court and which a wife may manage and
dispose of-have traditionally been lacking in common law
property states. At one time Davis could be criticized'5 ' because
the husband's property" (370 U.S. at 70), i.e. without reference to a fixed percentage of
whatever her husband owned.
On the other hand, in community property jurisdictions both spouses are viewed as
having vested one-half interests in the community property. See note 36 supra. A court's
discretion in making a division of property between them is therefore not reflective of the
fact that a wife has no interest in the community property until a discretionary award is
made by the court. Instead, the court's discretion can be viewed as its power to divest
either spouse of part of his one-half interest should the court make an unequal division
because of fault, financial condition, etc. This is supported by the fact that in New Mexico
and Louisiana the community property must be equally divided. DE FUNIAK § 227, at 515.
In New Mexico it has been held that, absent a statute authorizing a court to make an
unequal division thereby divesting a spouse of a portion of his one-half, the court has no
such power. Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 499, 500, 185 P. 780, 793 (1919).
"' This term was used by Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799,
827 n.116 (1943), in describing the recently enacted and since repealed Oklahoma community property statute. Cahn noted that the wife's very limited power of control and
disposition over community property was difficult to reconcile with the concept of community property and with the "theoretical protestation" of the statute that each spouse
had a vested one-half interest therein. He further stated that "[wihenever the local
statute appears to be inspired by the objective of special tax privileges, unrelated to
historic institutions of the state, it must be examined with a high measure of skepticism."
Id. at 828. Perhaps the same could be said of Imel and Collins I.
The term "amiable fiction" was used by Justice Sutherland in Tyler v. United States,
281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930), to describe the common law notion that at death no transfer,
and hence it was argued no taxable transfer, occurred between husband and wife holding
property as tenants by the entirety. The taxpayer's argument was unsuccessful for reasons
not relevant here, but the language aptly describes the fiction that no transfer occurs in
Colorado or Oklahoma divorce property settlements because the wife is already a co-owner
of the property.
S At least it has not seemed so unfair as to persuade Congress to change the result.
One draft of a statute which would do so has been available since 1954. See ALI FED.
INCOME TAX STAT. § 257(a)(Feb. 1954 Draft).
151 See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 3, at 250-51.
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a wife's power to manage and dispose of her interest was also
lacking in the eight 5 ' community property states. Yet husbands
in those states received favorable tax treatment. It appears,
though, that in community property states there is a definite
trend toward making a wife a true co-owner. Common law property jurisdictions suffer by comparison.' 53
It has been asserted that the fairest regime of marital property is community property. 4 In that system both spouses are
recognized as equal partners and true co-owners. If Colorado and
Oklahoma wish to benefit husband/taxpayers in their states upon
the theory that husband and wife are co-owners of marital prop"' Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. DE FUNIAK § 1, at 1. While the wife's control and ability to dispose of her interest
were determinative in Davis, it might also be pointed out that there are other matters
which may be equally important such as her liability for debt. Id. § 94, at 235.
I" Texas, for instance, has allowed joint management of community income which
is commingled. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(b) (1971). A recently enacted statute in
Washington requires joint action to convey or encumber community property. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (1974). See generally Cross, The Community Property Law in
Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 729 (1974). California and Idaho have gone further than
joint management and control, placing the power of management and control of all community property in both spouses. CAL. CIv. §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1975). See Note,
Equal Managment and Control Under Senate Bill 569: "To Have and to Hold" takes on
New Meaning in California, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999 (1974). See also Glendon, supra note
35, at 38-39. The significant changes in Idaho are contained in IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (Supp.
1975):
Either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control
the community property, and either may bind the community property by
contract, except that neither the husband nor wife may sell, convey or encumber the community real estate unless the other joins in executing and
acknowledging the deed or other instrument of conveyance, by which the real
estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the consent in writing of
the other shall not obligate the separate property of the spouse who did not
so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife may by express
power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell, convey or
encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds, conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity herewith are hereby validated.
See Young, Joint Management and Control of Community Property in Idaho:A Prognosis,
11 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (1974).
"I Sassover, Matrimonial Law Reform: Equal Property Rights for Women, 44 N.Y.
STATE B. J. 406, 408 (1972). This is not to say that community property is without faults.
See, e.g., Younger, Louisiana Wives: Law Reform to Their Rescue, 48 TULANE L. REV. 566
(1974), and Younger, Community Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 211 (1973). See Glendon, supra note 35, at 38-39 for a recent discussion of
property law reform in favor of a wife in community property states.
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erty, the proper method would be to make them so. Imel relies
upon the theory that husband and wife are co-owners, but ignores
the fact that in Colorado they are not.
Danny C. Aardal

